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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

BEYOND DRUG COVERAGE: THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF
PRIVATIZATION REFORMS IN THE MEDICARE
MODERNIZATION ACT
ROBERT I. FIELD* AND RICHARD G. STEFANACCI**

I. INTRODUCTION
The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act
of 2003 (MMA)1 is most widely known for its implementation of outpatient
prescription drug coverage.2 The MMA’s most controversial aspect is its use
of private plans, rather than the federal government, to administer the
benefit.3 By providing for the management of coverage by private
prescription drug plans,4 the MMA effectuates a substantial new role for the
private sector in Medicare. The law also permits beneficiaries to obtain
drug coverage through more comprehensive private coverage arrangements
that combine medical and drug benefits.5 These arrangements, known as

* A.B., Harvard College; J.D., Columbia Law School; M.P.H., Harvard School of Public
Health; Ph.D., Boston University; Professor of Health Policy and Chair of the Department of
Health Policy and Public Health at University of the Sciences in Philadelphia.
** B.A., Boston College; D.O., Kirksville College of Osteopathic Medicine; M.G.A., A.T. Still
University School of Health Management; M.B.A., Keller Graduate School of Management,
DeVry University; Associate Professor of Health Policy and Founding Executive Director the
Health Policy Institute at University of the Sciences in Philadelphia. The authors are grateful to
Douglas Drake, M.S.P.H. for his research assistance.
1. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L.
No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. and 26 U.S.C.).
2. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395w-101–1395w-152 (Supp. IV 2004) (implementing Medicare
Part D, the outpatient prescription drug coverage program).
3. See John K. Iglehart, The New Medicare Prescription-Drug Benefit—A Pure Power
Play, 350 NEW ENG. J. MED., 826, 826-28 (2004) (discussing Republican-favored
competition between private plans and traditional Medicare and how Democrats railed the
privatization of the program).
4. See Susan Adler Channick, The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and
Modernization Act of 2003: Will it be Good Medicine for U.S. Health Policy?, 14 ELDER L.J.
237, 247 (2006) (“Under the MMA, private . . . [PDPs] administer the Part D drug benefit . . .
.”).
5. See id. (discussing how beneficiaries may choose to enroll in Medicare Advantage
plans, which provide Part A, Part B, and Part D benefits).
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Medicare Advantage plans (MA plans), expand the private sector role even
further.
Less obvious, however, are numerous other privatization reforms
sprinkled throughout the MMA. Each reform is fairly limited in scope when
considered separately. However, when viewed in combination, these
provisions hold the potential for a synergistic effect that is considerably
greater than the sum of the parts. No single privatization reform could
transform Medicare by itself, but the cumulative outcome could push
enrollment in private managed care plans to reach a critical mass at which
beneficiaries begin to view them as an accepted part of the Medicare
landscape. This potential effect has significant implications for future efforts
to promote privatization as a long-term alternative to Medicare’s traditional
structure.
II. PRIVATIZATION AND MEDICARE
The notion of privatizing Medicare is not new.6 Even at its inception in
1965, Congress balanced public and private roles in the program’s
administration.7 Legislators compromised to grant overall responsibility to
the federal government, originally through the Social Security
Administration, but delegated considerable portions of the day-to-day
administration to private insurance companies that administered claims and
made many coverage determinations.8 These private contractors were
officially designed as “intermediaries” for inpatient coverage under Part A of
the program and as “carriers” for outpatient coverage under Part B.9
Beginning in the 1980s, experiments in using private managed care
companies to administer all aspects of benefits in a unified manner boosted
privatization efforts.10 Beneficiaries choosing to participate in a managed

6. See Bryan E. Dowd et al., Fee-for-Service Medicare in a Competitive Market
Environment, 27 HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. 113 (2005) (commenting that since the beginning of
Medicare there has been a debate over the relationship between traditional Medicare and
private plans).
7. See Arthur E. Hess, Medicare After One Year, 35 J. RISK & INS. 119, 121 (1968)
(background on the enactment of Medicare and how the population is best served by
balancing private and government plans).
8. See id. at 121-22 (discussing the role of private plans as intermediaries and carriers
that are responsible for routine administrative activities such as claims processing).
9. Id. at 122.
10. For background on the use of managed care in Medicare, see Jo Ann Lamphere et
al., The Surge in Medicare Managed Care: An Update, 16 HEALTH AFF. 127 (1997). See also
Melissa M. Ostrowski, Medicare Advantage Private Fee-for-Service Plans: What Privatization
Means for Today’s Beneficiaries, 8 MARQ. ELDER’S ADVISOR 375, 376 (2007) (discussing the
attraction of Medicare beneficiaries to Medicare HMO plans and how enrollment in the HMO
plans grew from 1 million members in 1987 to 5.2 million by 1997).
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care plan received Medicare coverage through health maintenance
organizations (HMOs) rather than through the traditional, government-run
fee-for-service program.11 In return for accepting the restrictions that HMOs
impose, such as requiring prior authorization for expensive services and
referrals for visits to specialists, beneficiaries received a more comprehensive
set of benefits at lower premiums. The experiment, designated as Medicare
Part C, expanded in the early 1990s, and the Balanced Budget Act of 1997
renamed it Medicare+Choice.12 The Bipartisan Commission on the Future
of Medicare also debated this model as a response to Medicare’s long-term
solvency challenges in the late 1990s, but the issue’s contentiousness
contributed to the Commission’s failure to achieve consensus.13
Proponents of privatization contend that market competition can
engender better, more efficient coverage at lower cost.14 They also see it
fostering innovations over time that the traditional government-run program
is hard-pressed to match.15 Opponents of privatization counter that, in
practice, private plans tend to be more expensive and inefficient than
traditional Medicare and that the profit motive is likely to make investorowned companies less responsive to beneficiary needs.16 They fear that
privatization could ultimately lead to traditional Medicare’s demise, as it
evolves into a program that simply provides vouchers for the purchase of
private coverage.17
11. See Lamphere et al., supra note 10, at 129.
12. See Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251, 275 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395w-21 to w-29 (2000)) (establishing the Medicare+Choice
program); see also Marsha Gold, Medicare+Choice: An Interim Report Card, 20 HEALTH AFF.
120, 121 (2001) (providing background on Medicare+Choice and participating managed
care plans’ experiences).
13. Barbara Markham Smith & Sara Rosenbaum, Potential Effects of the “PremiumSupport” Proposal on the Security of Medicare, 282 JAMA 1760, 1760 (1999).
14. See Press Release, Office of Press Sec’y, The White House, Fact Sheet: Medicare
Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003(Dec. 8, 2003), at
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/12/print/20031208-3.html (last visited Oct. 9,
2007) (asserting that market-place competition will ensure better and more affordable
coverage to strengthen and modernize Medicare).
15. See id. (“Private sector competition will result in more innovation and flexibility in
coverage.”).
16. See Medicare Advantage Private Fee-for-Service Plans: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Health of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 110th Congress (May 22, 2007) (statement
of Mark E. Miller, Executive Director, Medicare Payment Advisory Commission), available at
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/media/pdf/110/MillerTestimony.pdf (last visited Oct. 9,
2007).
17. See Press Release, Ctr. for Health Policy & Ctr. for Primary Care and Outcomes
Research, Stanford Univ., Health Vouchers Plan Would Cover all Americans and Preserve
Choice, Competition (Mar. 24, 2005), at http://healthpolicy.stanford.edu/news/health_
vouchers_plan_would_cover_all_americans_and_preserve_choice_competition_20050324/
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The MMA is a triumph for privatization proponents, as it affords an
unusual opportunity to gain public acceptance under extremely favorable
conditions. Supporters already point to substantial growth in private plan
enrollment under the MMA as evidence of privatization’s appeal.18 Within
the next few years, both the proponents and opponents of privatization will
point to experience under the MMA as evidence of either the wisdom or folly
of this approach. The key public policy question is whether private plan
performance truly reflects beneficiary attitudes or is actually an artifact of
legislative incentives.
At least seven privatization incentives are embodied in various MMA
provisions.19 One of the most significant incentives is a set of enhanced
government subsidies to MA plans that enable them to charge artificially low
premiums.20 While recent initiatives in Congress would reduce their funding
level, the real impact of these subsidies lies in the potential for a cumulative
effect through their interaction with other MMA provisions. An appreciation
of this phenomenon, not just of each incentive in isolation, is essential to
understanding the true nature of the market’s ultimate response to private
plans. While the more subtle synergistic effect of the MMA’s privatization
incentives so far has received relatively little public attention, it could be the
deciding factor in assessing the private plans’ experiences.
This article briefly reviews the MMA and the key private plan
enhancements it contains. It then considers how these enhancements may
act synergistically to entice beneficiaries to join Medicare Advantage. The
article concludes by observing that this legislative structure could produce a
level of beneficiary acceptance of Medicare privatization that does not
reflect actual market conditions.

(last visited Oct. 9, 2007) (stating that if healthcare would move to a voucher system,
Medicaid would “disappear” and Medicare would be “phased out”).
18. See Medicare Advantage: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health of the H. Comm.
on Ways and Means, 110th Congress (Mar. 21, 2007) [hereinafter CBO Testimony]
(statement of Peter R. Orszag, Director, Congressional Budget Office) available at
www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/78xx/doc7879/03-21-Medicare.pdf (last visited Oct. 9, 2007) (private
fee-for-service plans membership increased from 200,000 at the end of 2005 to upwards of
1.3 million members at the beginning of 2007, and membership is projected to reach 5
million members by 2017).
19. See infra Part IV (discussing the MMA’s private plan incentives). See generally NAT’L
COMM. TO PRESERVE SOC. SEC. & MEDICARE, VIEWPOINT: THE PRIVATIZATION OF MEDICARE (June
2006), at www.ncpssm.org/news/archive/vp_medprivatization/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2007)
[hereinafter NAT’L. COMM.] (discussing the MMA’s increased incentives for MA plans, such as
the stabilization fund and the comparative cost adjustment project).
20. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-23 (Supp. IV 2004) (payments to Medicare Advantage
organizations); see also NAT’L. COMM., supra note 19 (discussing how both the stabilization
fund and comparative cost adjustment project subsidize private plans and afford these plans
an unfair competitive advantage because they are able to offer better benefits at a lower cost).
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III. BACKGROUND ON THE MMA
The MMA was enacted on December 8, 2003 following a highly
partisan and contentious gestation.21 After an intense and sometimes
emotional debate, it passed the House of Representatives by only five
votes.22 Much of the controversy surrounding its passage focused on the
legislation’s reliance on the private market rather than on the government as
a means of Medicare administration.23 Traditional Medicare is administered
by the federal Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) within the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).24 The MMA transferred
important new roles from CMS to private insurance plans.25
The MMA’s primary thrust was to implement outpatient prescription drug
coverage,26 but it also addressed an array of unrelated issues. Some
elements were included to attract political support, but many reinforce an
underlying privatization agenda. The drug benefit, labeled Medicare Part D,
creates the platform for larger reform through its reliance on private plan
administration.27 These plans may operate on a stand-alone basis as
prescription drug plans (PDPs) or as part of broader MA plans that replace
Parts A and B of Medicare with their own integrated coverage structure.28

21. JENNIFER O’SULLIVAN ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., OVERVIEW OF THE MEDICARE
PRESCRIPTION DRUG, IMPROVEMENT, AND MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2003, CRS-1 (Dec. 2003).
For an overview of the heated political environment in which the MMA was passed, see
ANDREA LOUISE CAMPBELL & KIMBERLY MORGAN, THE SHIFTING LINE BETWEEN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE:
THE POLITICS OF THE 2003 MEDICARE MODERNIZATION ACT AND PRESCRIPTION DRUG REFORM
(prepared for the Social Science History Association Annual Meeting, Portland Oregon, Nov.
3-6, 2005).
22. O’SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 21 (the House of Representatives voted 220 to 215 to
approve H.R. 1).
23. See generally Theodore R. Marmor & Jerry L. Mashaw, Understanding Social
Insurance: Fairness, Affordability, and the ‘Modernization’ of Social Security and Medicare,
2006 HEALTH AFF. (WEB EXCL.) W114, W118, W130-32 (asserting that the MMA’s promotion
of private insurance undermines the social insurance concept that created Medicare).
24. EARL DIRK HOFFMAN ET AL., CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., BRIEF SUMMARIES OF
MEDICARE & MEDICAID: TITLE XVIII AND TITLE XIX OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT 3 (Nov. 1, 2003),
available at www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicareProgramRatesStats/downloads/MedicareMedicaid
Summaries2003.pdf (last visited Oct. 9, 2007).
25. See Letter from Kathleen M. King, Dir. Health Care, U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office,
to Max Baucus, Senator, Ranking Minority Member, Comm. on Fin. (Dec. 16, 2005),
available at www.gao.gov/new.items/d06278r.pdf (last visited Oct. 9, 2007) (discussing
potential problems with the transition of responsibilities from CMS to private Part D plans).
26. See Channick, supra note 4, at 238.
27. Id. at 263-65.
28. Id. at 264.
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Two of Part D’s key features are that participation is voluntary and that
beneficiaries who enroll choose from a wide assortment of plans.29 Each
plan structures its own benefits and premiums based on a minimum statutory
design that includes an annual deductible, tiered co-payments, and, in a
unique departure from traditional coverage, a “doughnut hole” with no
reimbursement between the initial and catastrophic layers of coverage.30 In
2007, this gap extended between $2,400 and $5,451 in annual
expenditures.31 Coverage is also limited by each plan’s formulary that lists
which drugs are reimbursable without an appeal.32 Premiums vary with the
generosity of coverage, and subsidies are available for beneficiaries with
incomes close to the poverty line and those on Medicaid.33
IV. KEY MMA PRIVATIZATION PROVISIONS

A. Medicare Advantage Reimbursement
The most significant privatization reform is the transformation of
Medicare Part C into Medicare Advantage at considerable government
expense.34 The MMA increased subsidies for participating plans by
10.6%,35 amounting to a $1.3 billion increase in payments to plans in
2005.36 The total cost of the new subsidies for the program’s first ten years
is estimated at $14 billion.37 The MMA also buffered plans from the
financial consequences of adverse risk selection during the first two years

29. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., DEPT. HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., MEDICARE &
YOU 43-44 (2007) [hereinafter MEDICARE & YOU].
30. See Scott A. Berkowitz et al., Medicare Prescription Drug Coverage Gap: Navigating
the “Doughnut Hole” with Patients, 297 JAMA 868, 868-69 (2007) (discussing Medicare Part
D and the doughnut hole).
31. MEDICARE & YOU, supra note 29, at 45 (After a beneficiary and plan have spent up to
$2,400 for covered drugs, the beneficiary must pay out-of-pocket drug costs up to $3,051.25
before catastrophic coverage kicks in.).
32. Id. at 46.
33. See Dep’t. of Health & Human Servs., Prescription Drug Coverage: Basic Information,
at www.medicare.gov/pdp-basic-information.asp (last visited Oct. 9, 2007) (noting that
qualified beneficiaries with “limited income and resources . . . may not have to pay a premium
or deductible”).
34. See Channick, supra note 4.
35. Iglehart, supra note 3, at 831.
36. THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICARE: MEDICARE ADVANTAGE (Sept. 2005),
available at www.kff.org/medicare/upload/Medicare-Advantage-April-2005-Fact-Sheet.pdf
(last visited Oct. 9, 2007).
37. BRIAN BILES ET AL., THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, THE COST OF PRIVATIZATION: EXTRA
PAYMENTS TO MEDICARE ADVANTAGE PLANS—2005 UPDATE 2 (2004), available at
www.cmwf.org/usr_doc/750_Biles_costofprivatization_update_ib_pdf.pdf (last visited Oct. 9,
2007).
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with a $10 billion “stabilization fund” that limits losses.38 While Congress
reduced the stabilization fund to $3.5 billion in 2006,39 its cost to the
government remains substantial.
In addition to these financial rewards, the MMA granted private MA
plans considerable advantages over PDPs in structuring drug coverage.
These plans can integrate prescription benefits with physician and hospital
services to coordinate the continuum of care and can implement innovations
such as disease management.40 They enjoy greater leeway to tailor copayments and deductibles to beneficiary needs and can even eliminate the
doughnut hole in their more generous offerings.41 They have greater
flexibility to cover some drugs, such as benzodiazepines, for which Medicare
Part D otherwise prohibits reimbursement.42 The MMA also encouraged
plans to offer an expanded array of designs beyond restrictive HMOs by
making it easier to structure more flexible preferred provider organization
(PPO) models and even fee-for-service (FFS) plans that mimic traditional
Medicare.43
The private market responded quickly to these incentives.44 The number
of CMS contracts with Part C plans rose by over 25% during the first year
after the MMA’s enactment;45 and enrollment increased even more rapidly

38. O’SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 21, at CRS-14.
39. THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICARE: MEDICARE ADVANTAGE (Mar. 2007),
available at www.kff.org/medicare/upload/2052-09.pdf (last visited Oct. 9, 2007).
40. See Medicare Advantage and the Federal Budget: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on
the Budget, 110th Cong. 8 (2007) (statement of Peter R. Orszag, Director, Congressional
Budget Office), available at http://cbo.gov/ftpdocs/82xx/doc8265/06-28-Medicare
Advantage.pdf (last visited Oct. 9, 2007) (noting that “[h]ealth plans may be more able to
manage care through . . . centralized administrative arrangements”).
41. See O’SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 21, at CRS-3 (discussing the opportunity for plans
to substitute cost-sharing requirements and to apply tiered co-payments if both are actuarially
consistent). But see NAT’L COMM. TO PRESERVE SOCIAL SECURITY & MEDICARE, VIEWPOINT:
MEDICARE’S DOUGHNUT HOLE: A BITTER PILL TO SWALLOW (Sept. 2006), at www.ncpssm.org/
news/archive/vp_donuthole/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2007) (noting that 85% of private Part D
plans have a doughnut hole and the plans that do not are “very expensive”).
42. See MEDICARE & YOU, supra note 29, at 53.
43. See MARSHA GOLD, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., THE MEDICARE DRUG BENEFIT:
PREMIUMS AND COST-SHARING FEATURES IN MEDICARE’S NEW PRESCRIPTION DRUG PROGRAM,
2006, at 6-8 (2006), available at www.kff.org/medicare/upload/7517.pdf (detailing the
different types of private MA plans in existence, such as HMO, local PPO, and private FFS)
(last visited Oct. 11, 2007).
44. See CBO Testimony, supra note 18, at 7 (discussing the increase in Medicare
Advantage enrollment from 2005–2007, attributed to the MMA).
45. THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICARE HEALTH AND PRESCRIPTION DRUG PLAN
TRACKER [hereinafter DRUG PLAN TRACKER], at www.kff.org/medicare/healthplantracker/geo
results.jsp?r=1&n=&i=&c=&pt=8&yo=2&x=14&y=10 (last visited Oct. 10, 2007) (the
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in 2006.46 Similarly, total plan enrollment and market penetration have
grown steadily.
Table 1: Medicare Advantage Plan Contract and Enrollment Activity
Month

Enrollment47

Penetration Number of CMS contracts
(% of
with plans49
48
beneficiaries)

July 2003 (before 5,301,138
MMA)

12.6

235

July 2004

5,376,650

12.7

234

December 2004

5,498,494

12.8

234

May 2005

5,763,113

13.3

273

December 2005

6,121,678

14.0

273

April 2006 (with
drug coverage)

6,831,626

15.5

364

October 2006
(with drug
coverage)

7,611,200

17.3

364

June 2007 (with
drug coverage)

8,678,224

19.7

424

B.

Part B Premium Structure

Participation in Medicare Part B is voluntary and subject to a premium.50
However, other than Medicare Advantage, there is no private market for
comparable coverage. Therefore, 95% of those eligible choose to

number of CMS contracts with Coordinated Care Plans (CCPs) rose from 143 in 2004 to 182
in 2005, which is approximately a 27% increase).
46. See infra tbl.1.
47. This data comes from the Monthly Tracking Reports prepared by researchers at
Mathematica Policy Research, Inc. For links to the reports for the months cited in the table,
see THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICARE HEALTH AND PRESCRIPTION DRUG PLANS
MONTHLY TRACKING REPORTS, at www.kff.org/medicare/advantagetrackingreport_archive.cfm
(last visited Oct. 10, 2007).
48. Id.
49. DRUG PLAN TRACKER, supra note 45.
50. MEDICARE & YOU, supra note 29, at 10.
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participate.51 The MMA, for the first time in Medicare’s history, scales Part B
premiums according to income with a five-year phase-in period, leading to
substantial cost differentiation.52 In 2007, higher-income beneficiaries were
paying $814.80 more than lower-income beneficiaries in annual
premiums.53 In 2009, the difference is projected to reach $3,073.54
Proponents of scaled premiums argue that public assistance should vary
according to need.55
However, the premiums for upper income
beneficiaries may increase to a level that will rival rates capable of
sustaining a private market.56 If a private market emerges, it would siphon
patients from and weaken the traditional program’s financial base.

C. Health Savings Accounts
Perhaps the most far-reaching MMA reform promotes the paradigm of
“consumer-driven” healthcare beyond Medicare as an alternative to
traditional employer-sponsored insurance for the non-elderly population.57
The underlying concept of the consumer-driven model is to replace thirdparty reimbursement for routine medical expenses with payment by the

51. HOFFMAN ET AL., supra note 24, at 13.
52. See O’SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 21.
53. See Press Release, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Medicare Premiums and
Deductibles for 2007 (Sept. 12, 2006), at www.cms.hhs.gov/apps/media/press/release.asp?
Counter=1958 (last visited Oct. 10, 2007) (showing that lower income beneficiaries pay a
monthly premium of $93.50 ($1,122 per year), whereas the higher income beneficiaries pay
a monthly premium of $161.40 ($1,936.80 per year)).
54. SENIOR CITIZENS LEAGUE, MEDICARE PREMIUMS EXPECTED TO JUMP 450 PERCENT FOR
SOME SENIORS AS MEANS TESTING TAKES EFFECT FOR FIRST TIME IN HISTORY (Sept. 6, 2006), at
www.tscl.org/newcontent/102743.asp (last visited Oct. 10, 2007) (showing that in 2009 the
projected monthly premium for lower income beneficiaries is $116.50 ($1,398 per year),
whereas the projected monthly premium for higher income beneficiaries is $372.60
($4,471.20 per year)).
55. See generally Mark V. Pauly, Means-Testing in Medicare, 2004 HEALTH AFF. (WEB
EXCL.) W4-546, W4-548 (discussing common arguments for and against means-testing and
also noting that Sen. John Kerry (D-MA) promoted limiting social insurance benefits for the
wealthy during his presidential campaign in 2004).
56. See generally SENIOR CITIZENS LEAGUE, supra note 54 (recognizing that “as wealthy
seniors abandon Medicare as it becomes more expensive and choose private insurance
instead, only the poorest and sickest will be stuck in Medicare, driving up costs for everyone
left behind”).
57. See Karen Davis, Consumer-Directed Health Care: Will It Improve Health System
Performance?, 39 HEALTH SERVICES RES. 1219, 1219 (2004) (discussing consumer-driven
health plans as an option offered by some employers and noting that a few employers have
replaced traditional coverage entirely with a consumer-driven plan).
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patient directly from a tax-advantaged savings account.58 Congress
authorized a limited trial of this approach in 1996, but its market uptake
was modest.59 The MMA significantly enhanced and re-titled the accounts
“health savings accounts” (HSAs).60 The new HSAs are portable across
employers, can accumulate funds until the beneficiary achieves Medicare
eligibility at age sixty-five, and earn tax-free interest and dividends. After
age sixty-five, money can be withdrawn for any purpose, not just to meet
medical expenses.61
Workers who remain healthy over the course of their careers can amass
a substantial HSA upon retirement, especially if they supplement employer
contributions with deposits of their own. At the same time, affluent retirees
will face a considerable cost for Part B coverage under the newly tiered
premium structure. For these beneficiaries, direct payment of medical
expenses from an HSA could become an attractive alternative to traditional
Medicare, further stressing the traditional system.

D. Medicaid Coverage
Medicaid, which is administered by the states, covers several categories
of beneficiaries with extremely low incomes and low levels of assets.62
Benefits include medical expense and prescription drug coverage.63
Approximately 7.5 million people are eligible for both Medicaid, based on
income, and Medicare, based on age or disability.64 The MMA assigned
drug coverage for these “dual eligibles” to Medicare, offering them
premium support and suspension of deductibles and most co-payments.65

58. See, e.g., UPMC HEALTH PLAN, HSA: A REVOLUTION IN HEALTH CARE 2, available at
www.upmchealthplan.com/plan/commercial/pdf/Health%20Savings%20Account.pdf
(last
visited Oct. 9, 2007) (describing the tax advantages of health savings accounts (HSAs)).
59. See Alexandra Minicozzi, Medical Savings Accounts: What Story do the Data Tell?,
25 HEALTH AFF. 256, 257-58 (2006).
60. Id. at 256 (describing HSAs as an expanded and broader version of medical savings
accounts (MSAs)).
61. See BOB LYKE & CHRIS L. PETERSON., CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: TAX-ADVANTAGED
ACCOUNTS FOR HEALTH CARE EXPENSES: SIDE-BY-SIDE COMPARISON CRS-4 tbl. (2007), available
at www.nahu.org/legislative/MSAs/HSAs-HSSAs/CRS-hsaTaxAdvantage.pdf (last visited Jan.
31, 2008).
62. THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., THE MEDICAID PROGRAM AT A GLANCE (Mar. 2007),
available at www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/7235-02.pdf (last visited Oct. 10, 2007).
63. Id.
64. JOHN HOLAHAN & ARUNABH GHOSH, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., DUAL
ELIGIBLES: MEDICAID ENROLLMENT AND SPENDING FOR MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES IN 2003, at
1(2005), available at www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/7346%20Dual%20Eligibles_Enrollment
%20and%20Spending_Beneficiaries_Final_revised%207_28.pdf (last visited Oct. 10, 2007).
65. See id. at 6 (outpatient prescription drugs were not covered under Medicare until the
MMA’s implementation in January 2006).
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Because they are guaranteed the drug benefit, dual eligibles are
automatically assigned to a Part D plan if they neglect to affirmatively
enroll.66 Assignment is random among qualified plans participating in their
region.67 However, dual eligibles may choose to join an MA plan.68 When
Part D was implemented in 2006, about 10% of dual eligibles were enrolled
in MA plans.69 In addition, some states require the dual eligibles to join a
Medicaid managed care plan.70 The result is increased enrollment in MA
plans of members who receive full premium subsidies. In addition, dual
eligibles have the ability to enroll in Special Needs Plans (SNPs), which, as
discussed below, offer benefits that typically exceed those of traditional feefor-service Medicare and Medicaid.

E.

Special Needs Plans

The MMA defined a new category of coverage that MA plans, but not
SNPs structure flexible benefit
traditional Medicare, may provide.71
arrangements for vulnerable populations, including patients residing in
institutions, dual eligibles, and those with severe and disabling conditions.72
In addition to having greater leeway in designing benefits, private plans that
offer SNPs are eligible for supplemental payments called “frailty adjusters.”73
This additional funding facilitates even more flexibility that the MMA denied
to the traditional Medicare program. To provide further support, 110,000
dual eligibles were passively enrolled in SNPs upon Part D’s launch in
January 2006.74

66. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-101(b)(1)(C) (Supp. IV 2004); see VERNON SMITH ET AL., THE
HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., THE TRANSITION OF DUAL ELIGIBLES TO MEDICARE PART D
PRESCRIPTION DRUG COVERAGE: STATE ACTIONS DURING IMPLEMENTATION 1 (2006), available at
www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/7467.pdf (last visited Oct. 10, 2007).
67. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-101(b)(1)(C).
68. Adam Atherly & Bryan E. Dowd, Effect of Medicare Advantage Payments on Dually
Eligible Medicare Beneficiaries, 26 HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. 93, 95 (2005).
69. See VERNON SMITH ET AL., supra note 66.
70. Atherly & Dowd, supra note 68.
71. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., IMPROVING ACCESS TO INTEGRATED CARE
FOR BENEFICIARIES WHO ARE DUALLY ELIGIBLE FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID (2006), at
www.cms.hhs.gov/pf/printpage.asp?ref=http://www.cms.hhs.gov/apps/media/press/release.
asp?Counter=1912 (last visited Oct. 10, 2007).
72. Id.
73. See MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: NEW
APPROACHES IN MEDICARE 87-89 (June 2004), available at www.medpac.gov/publications/
congressional_reports/June04_ch3.pdf (last visited Oct. 11, 2007) (describing the concept of
frailty adjusters).
74. VERNON SMITH ET AL., supra note 66, at 13.
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Medicare Solvency

Medicare is financed through a combination of sources, including a
dedicated payroll tax for Part A, premiums for Part B, and general
government revenues.75 Beginning in 2005, the MMA required the
program’s trustees to project general revenue as a percentage of total
Medicare spending in future years.76 If the projections foresee that in two
consecutive years within the next six these funds will exceed 45% of the total,
the president must respond with a remedial legislative proposal, and
Congress must act within a designated timeframe.77
In 2007, the Medicare Board of Trustees reported that the 45%
threshold would be triggered by 2013;78 therefore, the president is obligated
to present a solvency proposal by 2009.79 At that time, Medicare reform
will almost certainly rise on the political agenda. The atmosphere will be
officially designated as involving financial peril, albeit based on an arbitrary
criterion. This atmosphere will give supporters of private plans an
exceptional opportunity to promote their version of structural reform as an
alternative.

G. Competitive Demonstration Project in 2010
Finally, the MMA encourages private plans by creating a demonstration
project involving six regional markets that is scheduled to begin in 2010
and last for six years.80 The project will permit private plans to compete
directly with traditional Medicare.81 Beneficiaries will choose a coverage
provider, either governmental or private, under a premium formula that

75. BD. OF TRS. OF THE FED. OLD-AGE & SURVIVORS INS. & FED. DISABILITY INS. TRUST FUNDS,
STATUS OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY AND MEDICARE PROGRAMS: A SUMMARY OF THE 2007 ANNUAL
REPORTS (2007), available at www.ssa.gov/OACT/TRSUM/tr07summary.pdf (last visited Oct.
10, 2007) [hereinafter SOCIAL SECURITY & MEDICARE BOARD OF TRUSTEES].
76. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L.
No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066, 2357, 2360 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395).
77. Id. at 117 Stat. at 2357-60.
78. See SOCIAL SECURITY & MEDICARE BOARD OF TRUSTEES, supra note 75.
79. THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICARE: MEDICARE SPENDING AND FINANCING
(June 2007), available at www.kff.org/medicare/upload/7305-02.pdf (last visited Nov. 3,
2007).
80. See Board of Trustees 2004 Annual Reports: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways
and Means, 108th Cong. 12 (Mar. 24, 2004) (statement of Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Director,
Congressional Budget Office).
81. See Thomas A. Scully & Colin T. Roskey, New Directions in Medicare Managed Care:

The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 Makes
Regional, Open Network Plans A Reality, HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT., May 2004, at 64, 66
(discussing how the project forces private MA plans to compete against traditional Medicare
through benefits, quality, and cost).
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could make traditional Medicare the more expensive option82 and, in effect,
slant the competitive playing field to give private plans a formidable
advantage.
V. SYNERGISTIC EFFECT
The cumulative effect of these MMA provisions could be substantial.
With each provision, MA plans become more attractive to beneficiaries
relative to the traditional program. As plans grow in size, they will also gain
greater leverage in negotiations with healthcare providers and drug
companies, which may enable them to enhance their appeal even further.
A possible scenario would be the following: Medicare Advantage
enrollment continues to grow, in part due to premiums that are kept
artificially low through government subsidies. Plan numbers are further
inflated through the automatic enrollment of some Medicaid beneficiaries
and SNPs. At the same time, traditional Medicare faces growing financial
challenges that could reduce its appeal. These challenges include some
healthier and wealthier beneficiaries opting out because of rising Part B
premiums; some beneficiaries using HSA funds, combined with highdeductible insurance policies to purchase services directly in lieu of
participating in traditional Medicare; a disadvantaged position in the 2010
competitive demonstration project; and possible coverage reductions in
response to a presidential Medicare solvency proposal. This scenario would
reinforce a process of adverse selection in which the healthiest beneficiaries
withdraw from the traditional Medicare program, leaving it with a smaller,
more expensive risk pool. This result would make the traditional program
increasingly difficult to maintain.
In effect, the crescendo of private plan enhancements could push
enrollment to a critical mass. At that point, private plans could become
more widely viewed as an established part of Medicare rather than as an
experiment and be interpreted by the public as evidence of privatization’s
widespread appeal. The political case for wholesale market-based reform
would then find a more receptive political environment.
VI. CONCLUSION
Notwithstanding this substantial set of privatization incentives, both
explicit and subtle, the MMA does not guarantee the long-term success of
private plans. As of early 2007, private plans remained considerably more

82. See id. (describing a possible increase in traditional Medicare premiums if MA plans
are more efficient).
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costly than traditional Medicare.83 In 2006, payments to MA plans
averaged 12% higher than the cost of the government-run program.84 The
plans’ long-term economic viability depends on the capacity to generate
profits on their own as the MMA’s subsidies are not likely to continue
indefinitely.85 Pressures will grow over the next several years to reduce the
rate of Medicare spending growth, and subsidies to private plans are an
obvious target for congressional cost-cutters. Plans could institute increased
coverage restrictions to maintain profitability, but this could subject them to
the kind of public backlash that managed care experienced in the late
1990s and cause public acceptance to evaporate rapidly.
In essence, the MMA gives market-based Medicare reform an
opportunity to prove its worth under highly favorable conditions. However,
this approach remains an experiment. Both supporters and critics will point
to experience under the MMA as evidence of the experiment’s results.
In analyzing private plans’ experiences under the MMA, the less visible
privatization incentives reflected in the cumulative impact of several smaller
reforms deserve more widespread policy attention. Beneficiary acceptance
of MA plans is only relevant to the debate over privatization if it reflects a
true market response rather than reactions to a structured set of legislative
incentives. Policy analyses should carefully consider that the full impact of
these incentives might include effects that are more subtle than their explicit
provisions suggest.

83. CBO Testimony, supra note 18, at 4 (calculating that expenditures for private plans in
2007 will be about 12% higher than traditional FFS Medicare costs).
84. An Examination of the Medicare Advantage Program: Hearing Before the S.
Comm.on Finance, 109th Cong. 2 (statement of Glenn M. Hackbarth, Chairman, Medicare
Payment Advisory Commission).
85. See FAMILIESUSA, SPECIAL REPORT: WHOSE ADVANTAGE? BILLIONS IN WINDFALL PAYMENTS
GO TO PRIVATE MEDICARE PLANS 5 (June 2007), available at www.familiesusa.org/assets/pdfs/
medicare-private-plans.pdf (last visited Oct. 11, 2007) (discussing how private MA plans
largely rely on government subsidies to be profitable).

